updated docs

This commit is contained in:
Brian Seymour 2018-09-21 23:15:24 -05:00
parent a44a62f2df
commit 35ddde0106
2 changed files with 28 additions and 6 deletions

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@ -65,6 +65,6 @@ docker run \
piston \
runuser \
-l runner \
-c "/$bin /$file $file | head -c 1024 2>&1"
-c "/$bin /$file $file | head -c 65536 2>&1"
rm -f /tmp/$file

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
## Piston
This project is the underlying engine for running untrusted and possibly malicious code that originates
from from EMKC contests and challenges.
Piston is the underlying engine for running untrusted and possibly malicious code that originates
from from EMKC contests and challenges. It's also used in the Engineer Man Discord server via
[felix bot](https://github.com/engineer-man/felix).
#### Installation
- Install Docker https://www.docker.com/get-started
@ -9,14 +9,36 @@ from from EMKC contests and challenges.
- `cd piston/docker`
- `./build`
#### Usage
- `docker/execute <lang> <path to file>`
#### Supported Languages
Currently python2, python3, c, c++, go, node, and ruby are supported.
#### Principle of Operation
Piston utilizes Docker as the primary mechanism for sandboxing. There is a small API written in Go which takes
in execution requests and spawns new containers to execute the source from that request. High level, the API writes
a temporary source file to `/tmp` and that mounts that and all the execution scripts read-only in the container.
The source file is either ran or compiled and ran (in the case of languages like c, c++, go, etc.).
#### Security
Docker provides a great deal of security out of the box. Piston takes additional steps to make it resistant to
various privilege escalation, denial-of-service, and resource saturation threats. These steps include:
- Disabling outgoing network interaction
- Greatly reducing CPU allowance (resists CPU saturation)
- Capping memory at 64mb (resists RAM saturation)
- Capping max processes at 16 (resists `:(){ :|: &}:;`, `while True: os.fork()`, etc.)
- Capping max files at 128 (resists various file based attacks)
- Mounting all resources read-only (resists `sudo rm -rf --no-preserve-root /`)
- Capping runtime execution at 2 seconds
- Capping stdout to 65536 characters (resists yes/no bombs and runaway output)
- SIGKILLing misbehaving code
- Disabling journald logs (resists log flood)
#### Performance
One thing that needs investigation is how to spawn containers faster. The Docker daemon is synchronous in its
container spawning. This means the bottleneck for code execution is how fast containers can start. Environments
vary, but, in ours they start at a rate of no more than 1 per second.
#### License
Piston is licensed under the MIT license.